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LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS V. STATE :





On September 4, 2015, in a 6-3 decision in League of Women Voters
of Washington v, State, the Washington State Supreme Court became the
first in the nation to deem charter schools funded by taxpayers unconstitu-
tional.  Charter schools in Washington are not governed by elected boards;
thus, the Court found charter schools unaccountable to voters and not pub-
lic enough to be deemed “common schools” under the state constitution.
This recent decision splits with supreme courts in many other states who
recently faced similar constitutional challenges.  Thus, the question comes
to mind: How public is public enough when determining the constitution-
ality of a charter school? This note argues that the Washington Supreme
Court came to the wrong conclusion in League of Women by defining pub-
lic too narrowly and in the end, failed to serve the true purpose of article
IX, section 2 of the state constitution.  On the spectrum between public and
private, League of Women falls too far on the side of private because the
Court places too much textual emphasis on the state constitution, relies too
heavily on outdated precedent from over a century ago, and fails to draw
the appropriate line between restricted and unrestricted funding.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the heart of a successful democratic, republican government lies
accessible education for the people.  Thus, each state has a public
school system to provide its citizens with an education to foster produc-
tive, articulate, and creative participants in society and the economy.  In
particular, the Washington Constitution created a common school sys-
tem that must be both “general” and “uniform” and partially funded
through constitutionally protected funds.  On September 4, 2015,
Washington’s Supreme Court became the first in the country to find
taxpayer-funded charter schools unconstitutional.1  The court reasoned
that because charter schools under Initiative 1240 (“Charter School
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Arts,
Concordia College, 2014.  I would like to express my sincere gratitude for Professor
Nicole Stelle Garnett for her guidance and encouragement on this Note, the members of
the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy for their editorial assistance, and to my
family, friends, and loved ones for their support and contributions to my academic and
personal life.
1. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015).
201
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE106.txt unknown Seq: 2  7-SEP-17 11:12
202 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
Act” or “Act”)2 are run by appointed boards or nonprofit organizations,
charter schools are not subject to voter control.3  This lack of voter con-
trol means that charter schools cannot qualify as “common schools”
within the meaning of article IX, section 2 of the Washington Constitu-
tion.4  This recent decision makes Washington the first state to find
charter schools essentially not public enough.
Thus, a question comes to mind: how public is public enough
when determining the constitutionality of a charter school?  This Note
surveys a history of common schools in general and within the State of
Washington, including the recent surge of charter schools within the
United States, and the inherent legal issues arising from the hybridity of
charter schools, which are grounded in private sector concepts but
remain a public sector creature.  It then looks to the Washington
Supreme Court’s recent decision in League of Women.  This Note argues
that the court utilized a flawed application of dated case law.  Further,
this Note argues that the Act complies with the “uniform” and “general”
education requirements and funding provisions of the Washington
State Constitution.  On the spectrum between public and private,
League of Women falls too far on the side of private because the court
rigidly adheres to outdated precedent from over a century ago and fails
to draw the appropriate line between restricted and unrestricted fund-
ing.  After discussing the flawed reasoning of League of Women, this Note
turns to the necessary evolution of the Washington school system,
which should include charter schools.  Last, this Note discusses how
League of Women might impact and spur future state constitutional chal-
lenges to charter schools.
II. EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION WITHIN THE STATES
Though citizens often take the concept of free public education
for granted today, early American colonists would not have expected
tax-supported schools.5  Education, however, was a priority.  Free state
school systems were proposed by political theorists, such as Thomas Jef-
ferson and Benjamin Rush, but these early proposals for state-run edu-
2. Initiative Measure No. 1240 (2012) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 28A.710.040(3) (2012)), invalidated by League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355
P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015) (“Public charter schools must comply with all state statutes and
rules made applicable to the charter school in the school’s charter contract and are sub-
ject to the specific state statutes and rules identified in subsection (2) of this section.
Charter schools are not subject to and are exempt from all other state statutes and rules
applicable to school districts and school district boards of directors, for the purpose of
allowing flexibility to innovate in areas such as scheduling, personnel, funding, and edu-
cational programs in order to improve student outcomes and academic achievement.
Charter schools are exempt from all school district policies except policies made applica-
ble in the school’s charter contract.”).
3. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1132.
4. Id.
5. L.K. Beale, Charter Schools, Common Schools, and the Washington State Constitution, 72
WASH. L. REV. 535, 537 (1997).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE106.txt unknown Seq: 3  7-SEP-17 11:12
2017] LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS V. STATE 203
cation failed to gather enough support.6  Nevertheless, every state
eventually established a form of state-run, tax-supported school system.
The definition and application of common schools has evolved
over time.  Originally, the term common school referred to a “vernacu-
lar school for ‘common folk’ as opposed to a Latin preparatory school
for the upper classes.”7  After that, common schools were considered
one-room schoolhouses where students were separated by level of learn-
ing rather than age.8  More recently, common schools refer to public
schools open to all children within a locality.9  This shift towards mass
education comes from the American philosophical perspectives and
political objectives from over a century ago.10  Through mass educa-
tion, America could define itself as a country, teach patriotism and
moral values, and develop a skilled, productive, and innovative work
force.  Ideally, common schools should “serve individual interests
founded in liberal philosophy as well as communitarian goals founded
in both democratic and republican theory.”11
Common schools represented a public good for all students within
a locality.  Thus, state constitutions codified the importance of an edu-
cation for the survival of a democratic government.  For example, the
Washington Constitution states: “It is the paramount duty of the state to
make ample provision for the education of all children residing within
its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color,
caste, or sex.”12  Additionally, many states provide positive rights to edu-
cation that is “equal” or “sufficient” or “uniform.”13  Specifically, Wash-
ington must “provide for a general and uniform system of public
schools.”14  However, these positive rights given to students are nearly
impossible to define and apply.  This creates conflict between the con-
stitutional rights of state citizens to a common school education that is
“sufficient” or “uniform” and the reality of state debt, limited resources,
and racial and socioeconomic inequalities.
6. Id. (Jefferson and Rush proposed an education system “to prepare men to vote
intelligently, to perpetuate a republican government, to produce disciplined citizens, and
to unify a diverse population.”); id. at 537–38 (Rush sought to create a uniform system to
“render the mass of people more homogeneous, and thereby fit them more easily for
uniform and peaceable government.”).
7. Id. at 536.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices
of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 169 (1996).
11. Id.
12. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (“Knowledge and learn-
ing, generally diffused throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a
free government; it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable
means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by
law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be with-
out charge, and equally open to all.”); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
13. See ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (“The state shall provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services.”) (emphasis added); ORE. CONST. art.
VIII, § 3 (“establishment of a uniform, and general system of Common schools”) (emphasis
added).
14. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE106.txt unknown Seq: 4  7-SEP-17 11:12
204 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
Legislatures and administrators struggle to uphold state constitu-
tional educational rights partially because of how much schools have
changed since state constitutions were enacted.  As the country
becomes more diverse—racially and economically—and more popu-
lated, applying vague standards of uniformity and equality becomes
nearly impossible.  For example, at statehood in 1889, Washington
maintained three high schools with 320 students enrolled.15  Less than
ten years later, the average daily public school attendance was 50,700,
with forty-five students graduated from high school.16  However, Wash-
ington schools currently serve more than one million students in
approximately 2,281 public schools.17  Thus, applying Washington’s
constitutional requirements of “general” and “uniform” schools is prac-
tically unworkable.  Washington’s public school system, like most other
states, differs greatly from the one in existence at statehood.  There-
fore, just as the demographics of states and the nation have evolved
over time, so must the methods of providing education through com-
mon schools.
In the past fifty years, efforts have been made to change the struc-
ture of public education in order to equalize opportunities.18  For
example, school desegregation and school finance reform attempted to
erase racial and financial boundaries between schools.19  Despite these
alterations, the American school system still struggled, and from this
struggle emerged the concept of school choice.  Under public school
choice, if a student goes to a Title I school that the state identified as
needing improvement, corrective action, or restructuring, parents may
choose to send the student to another public school that meets educa-
tional standards.20  Under the Voluntary Public School Choice Pro-
gram, parents, especially if their child attends a low-performing public
school, have expanded education options.21  Additionally, the school
district must cover the student’s transportation costs.22  Some of the
school choice options include magnet schools, private education,
homeschooling, and charter schools.23  School choice aims to allow
parents to select a different school among a variety of non-tuition
options for their child if they are unsatisfied with the performance of
their child’s public school.24  School choice helps address and provide
15. Brief of Respondent at 5, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d
1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE
L.J. 2043, 2050 (2002).
19. Id.
20. School Choices for Parents, U.S. DEPT. OF ED., http://www2.ed.gov/parents/




24. Samantha L. Skabla, Note, Charter Schools and Their Effect on Providing Equal Edu-
cation Opportunities to Students in Philadelphia, 3 RUTGERS J. L. & URB. POL’Y 471, 472
(2006).
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a partial solution to the current inequalities within public school
districts.
Charter schools represent one form of school choice.  Charter
schools can take many different forms, but typically, they are schools
run by private organizations—such as teachers, parents, or private cor-
porations—that receive public funding and are nonsectarian.25  Addi-
tionally, state enabling statutes must authorize charter schools.26  State
statutes grant charter schools greater flexibility than traditional public
schools in exchange for greater accountability.27  In 1991, Minnesota
passed the first charter school law.28  As of March 2015, forty-three
states and the District of Columbia have enacted charter school legisla-
tion.29  Charter schools are growing quickly across the nation due to
bipartisan support from governors, state legislators, and secretaries of
education.30
This vast support indicates a need and desire for evolution within
the education sector and a shift from the concept of education, either
in purely public or private spheres, to a hybrid form of education
catered to the needs of the student.  However, some critique charter
schools as a “retreat for middle-class minority and white students, leav-
ing the most at-risk students behind in under funded, inadequate pub-
lic schools.”31  Opponents of charter schools believe charter schools,
because private organizations run them, create “a market system” where
“poor urban public schools” cannot compete.32  Many charter schools,
however, run under a lottery system and thus provide lower-income stu-
dents with opportunities previously available only to more affluent fami-
lies.  Charter schools, if run properly with the goals of school choice,
allow students to freely choose their school, thus providing high-quality
educational opportunities across various socioeconomic groups and res-
idential areas.33
25. Id. at 472–73.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 473.
28. Id.
29. Choice & Charter Schools, CTR. FOR ED. REFORM, https://www.edreform.com/
issues/choice-charter-schools/laws-legislation/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2016) (listing that the
states without charter school laws are Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia.).
30. Skabla, supra note 24, at 473; see also Fast Facts: Charter Schools, NAT. CTR. FOR ED.
STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=30 (last visited Feb. 4, 2016)
(stating that from the 1999-2000 school year to the 2012-2013 school year, the percentage
of public schools that were charter schools increased from 1.7 percent to 6.2 percent and
that the total number of public charter schools increased from 1,500 to 6,100.).
31. Skabla, supra note 24, at 474.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see Ryan & Heise, supra note 18, at 2086 (discussing that school districts with
higher property values and income brackets have the advantage of being able to spend
more of their revenue on students because their students come to school with few of the
problems that plague students living in poverty and that school choice would allow stu-
dents to choose freely among schools, thus breaking down the current income and race
segregation within education).
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Charter schools represent one form of evolution within the educa-
tional sector.  Charter schools create a hybrid within the common
school system.  No longer are there distinct lines between public com-
mon schools and private schools.  Additionally, citizens’ perspectives of
public schools is shifting from strictly a public service to more of a pub-
lic good.  Public education has become more of a commodity within the
public sector.  Charter schools are “grounded in private-sector concepts
such as competition-driven improvement . . . . But they remain very
much a public-sector creature, with in-bred requirements of accounta-
bility and broad-based equity.”34  While it is too early to determine the
true effects of charter schools and the charter laws differ from state to
state, what is for certain is that the American system of public education
is struggling.  In many cases, it is failing its students and falling short of
state constitutional requirements.  Thus, charter schools may or may
not be a lasting solution, but it is important to test out new educational
strategies in order to discover the most effective system of public
education.
III. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF WASHINGTON V. STATE
In November 2012, Washington state voters approved Initiative
1240, codified in the Charter School Act (“Act”) which allows the estab-
lishment and operation of charter schools.35  This narrowly passed Act
came after a long, hard debate.  Washington state voters denied charter
school legislation three times prior to enacting the Act.36  The 2012
initiative was supported by many philanthropic organizations, such as
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Bezos Family Founda-
tion.37  However, the Washington Education Association and various
other groups vocalized their disapproval of the initiative.38  The Act
would create forty charter schools within five years, and its purpose was
to give parents more options regarding the education of their chil-
dren.39  Additionally, the Act deemed charter schools public common
schools open to all students without tuition.40  The Act was challenged
for being facially unconstitutional, and on September 4, 2015, the state
of Washington became the first state to find charter schools unconstitu-
34. Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
35. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131, 1134 (Wash. 2015).
36. Emma Brown, What makes a public school public? Washington state court finds charter






39. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.710.005(1)(n)(i), (f) (2012), invalidated by League
of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015), amended in 2016.
40. Id.
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tional.41  By the time the court filed the opinion, nine charter schools
were operating; eight of them opened their doors in August 2015.42
A. Summary of League of Women
In a 6–3 decision, the Washington Supreme Court struck down the
Act as facially unconstitutional.  Chief Justice Madsen wrote the major-
ity opinion which relied on two main findings.  First, the court found
that charter schools are not common schools under article IX, section 2
of the Washington State Constitution.43  Additionally, because charter
schools are not deemed common schools by the court, the Act’s fund-
ing provisions, which shift the portion of common school funding for
each student to the new charter schools, are void and not severable
from the Act.44
The majority’s analysis regarding whether charter schools are com-
mon schools turns on the language of article IX, section 2 of the state
constitution and the court’s case law from 1909.  Article IX, section 2
provides:
The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of
public schools.  The public school system shall include common
schools, and such high schools, normal schools, and technical
schools as may hereafter be established.  But the entire revenue
derived from the common school fund and the state tax for com-
mon schools shall be exclusively applied to the support of the
common schools.45
Article IX, section 2 was discussed in School District No. 20 v. Bryan.46
The court declined to overturn Bryan because “intervenors offer[ed] no
compelling reason to abandon [it].”47  Additionally, the court declined
to “‘recognize an evolving common school system’ and not [to] read
Bryan as ‘a static statement of constitutional imperatives.’”48  The court
applied Bryan’s rule that, “[A] common school . . . is common to all
children . . . free, and subject to, and under the control of, the qualified
voters of the school district.  The complete control of the schools is a
most important feature, for it carries with it the right of the voters,
through their chosen agents, to select qualified teachers, with powers to
discharge them if they are incompetent.”49  The court reasoned that
charter schools are not subject to the voter control necessary under
Bryan to qualify as common schools under article IX.50
41. See League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015).
42. See Debbie Cafazzo & Melissa Santos, State Supreme Court Says no—again—to
Washington charter schools, NEWS TRIB. (Nov. 19, 2015, 4:17pm), http://www.thenewstrib
une.com/news/local/education/article45547353.html.
43. See League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1131.
44. See id.
45. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
46. School Dist. No. 20 v. Bryan, 99 P. 28, 28–29 (Wash. 1909).
47. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1131.
48. Id. at 1137.
49. Bryan, 99 P. 29–30.
50. See League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1137.
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The majority argues that charter schools are devoid of local control
in two significant ways.  First, charter school authorizers may monitor
the performance and legal compliance of charter schools,51 but cannot
“unduly inhibit the autonomy granted to charter schools”52 and must
develop and follow policies consistent with the National Association of
Charter School Authorizers’ standards.53  The majority deems this shar-
ing of power and flexibility granted to charter schools to be too great,
and thus deems charter schools “devoid of local control from their
inception to their daily operation.”54  Second, the court takes issue with
the charter school board which operates charter schools.55  The court
reasons that because charter schools are run by an appointed board or
nonprofit organization, charter schools are not accountable to local vot-
ers in the same or equivalent way as traditional public schools with
elected school board members.56
After finding that charter schools are not common schools under
article IX, the court determined that the funding provisions of the Act
that shifted existing school funding are unconstitutional.  The Washing-
ton State Constitution directs the legislature to fund common schools
and restricts the legislature’s ability to “divert funds committed to com-
mon schools for other purposes even if related to education.”57  The
court also rejected the State’s position that the Act may be funded
because funding “follows the students” and the Act could be funded by
the state general fund.58  The court reasoned that funding does not
follow the student if the student no longer attends a common school.59
Additionally, when a child is no longer attending a common school,
there is no entitlement to part of the state school fund.60  Thus, the
court found the Act’s funding provisions unconstitutional where it
acquires money designated to common schools.
Lastly, the majority held that these unconstitutional provisions
render the Act unconstitutional in its entirety.61  The court found that
while the Act contains a severability clause, the invalid provisions of the
Act are too intertwined with the remainder of the Act “and so funda-
mental to the Act’s efficacy” that the invalid portions are not severa-
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.180(1) (2012), invalidated by League of Women
Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015), amended in 2016.
52. Id. at § 28A.710.180(2).
53. Id. at § 28A.710.100(3).
54. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1134.
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.020(3) (2012), invalidated by League of Women
Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015), amended in 2016.
56. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1136.
57. Id. at 1140; see generally WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.220(2) (2012) (discussing
the powers of the superintendent of public instruction to distribute state funding to char-
ter schools), invalidated by League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131
(Wash. 2015), amended in 2016; WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.380(1) (2012) (requiring the
state legislature biennially to appropriate funds to the school districts), invalidated by
League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015), amended in 2016.
58. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1136.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1140 (citing State v. Preston, 140 P. 350 (1914)).
61. See id. at 1141.
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ble.62  Justice Fairhurst, however, dissented to the majority’s holding of
lack of severability.  According to Fairhurst, the unconstitutional provi-
sions are severable because Washington’s constitution identifies only
three funds restricted solely to common schools.63  Fairhurst notes that
the Act does not direct the legislature to expend any principal from the
common school fund.64  Additionally, the interest from the common
school fund has not been diverted to support charter schools.65
Fairhurst clarifies for the majority that the Act does not have to appro-
priate state tax for common schools because only twenty-eight percent
of the general fund’s revenue is from state tax for common schools.66
Thus, charter schools, as a mere two percent of Washington’s public
schools, can certainly be funded through the remaining seventy-two
percent.67  Lastly, access to the restricted construction fund is not nec-
essary, according to Fairhurst.  The Act only provides that charter
schools are “eligible for state matching funds for common school con-
struction.”68  Funds for school construction come from the state build-
ing construction account and the common school construction
account.69  Therefore, the Act may be funded through the state build-
ing construction account or the unrestricted revenues in the general
fund.70  In the end, Fairhurst argues that the appellants failed to meet
their burden under a facial challenge to show that the funding provi-
sions were not severable.
B. Flawed Application of Case Law in Analysis of League of Women
In League of Women, the court must determine whether the Act is
unconstitutional on its face because the plaintiffs’ challenge is facial.
Therefore, the Act must be found constitutional unless the court is cer-
tain that there is no set of facts or circumstances under which the stat-
ute can constitutionally be applied.71  This is a very high bar for the
plaintiffs to reach, and they failed to do so.
The most pervasive flaw within the majority’s reasoning is a limited
view perspective on case law.  The majority relies mainly on Bryan—a
case from 1909—for its case law precedent.  While stare decisis is an
essential part of the nation’s judicial system, it is only effective and help-
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1142 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting); see generally WASH. CONST. art. IX,
§§ 2–3 (establishing that the three protected funds are the permanent common school
fund, the state tax for common schools, and the common school construction fund).
64. See League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1142 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1143.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 1136 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.230(1) (2012), invalidated by
League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015), amended in
2016).
69. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1143 (Fairhurst, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
70. Id.
71. Brief of Respondent at 14, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d
1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0).
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ful when all relevant case law is taken into account and put into
context.
In 1909, the court was asked to determine whether Washington
State’s normal schools—public schools associated with teacher-training
institutions—were able to receive common school funding as common
schools.72  At the time, Washington statutes had long defined common
schools as schools that were “maintained at public expense in each
school district and under the control of boards of directors” and “open
to the admission of all children . . . residing in that school district.”73
The Bryan court held that a common school under the state constitu-
tion “is one that is common to all children of proper age and capacity,
free, and subject to, and under the control of, the qualified voters of
the school district.”74  Further, the Bryan court noted that the “com-
plete control of the schools is a most important feature, for it carries
with it the right of the voters, through their chosen agents, to select
qualified teachers, with the power to discharge them if they are
incompetent.”75
The court in League of Women reads the language of Bryan very
strictly when it applies it to the Act.  In doing so, the court’s decision
lands far on the public end of the spectrum when determining whether
and how public charter schools must be under the state constitution to
qualify as common schools.  In the current state of education reform—
where voters, parents, and legislatures are emphasizing school choice
and embracing a more hybrid notion of public schooling—the court
should have taken a more functional approach to applying Bryan to the
Act.  The court too quickly deems the fact that charter schools under
the Act are run by appointed board members or nonprofit organiza-
tions as a fatal flaw, thus rendering charter schools outside the provi-
sions of common schools under article IX of the Washington State
Constitution.76  At the heart of the Bryan dicta on voter control is the
idea of accountability between the tax payers and the school officials.
The charter school board’s appointment process does not mean that
charter schools are not accountable or under the control of local vot-
ers.  In fact, in some ways charter schools are held more accountable to
voters than traditional public schools are through elected school boards
because charter schools must strictly follow their contract and have
their students perform well on state tests in order for the charter to be
renewed.
Another egregious mistake in the court’s case law analysis is the
fact that the court never mentions McCleary v. State.77  In McCleary,
respondents brought a declaratory action alleging that the state was vio-
lating article IX, section 1 by failing to amply fund the K–12 school
72. School Dist. No. 20 v. Bryan, 99 P. 28, 28–29 (Wash. 1909).
73. Brief of Respondent at 22, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d
1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0) (citing Laws of 1897, ch. CXVIII, § 64, p. 384).
74. School Dist. No. 20 v. Bryan, 99 P. 28, 30 (Wash. 1909).
75. Id.
76. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131, 1137 (Wash. 2015).
77. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012).
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system.78  The Washington Supreme Court found that the state was fail-
ing to adequately fund K–12 education.79  When summarizing the cen-
tral portions of the decision, the court held that article IX, section 1
“confers on children in Washington a positive constitutional right to an
amply funded education.”80  Further, it found that “[t]he program of
basic education is not etched in constitutional stone,” and the legisla-
ture should review the education program “as the needs of students and
the demands of society evolve.”81  These holdings, however, are never
mentioned in League of Women.  This is especially odd because it is a very
recent case regarding article IX of the constitution.  Further, it provides
a helpful, modern framework for determining the legislature’s role and
duties in providing for the education of Washington citizens.
Therefore, by emphasizing Bryan without adequately describing
why precedent from 1909 should be applicable, the court fails to prop-
erly articulate the case law regarding common schools in general.  Fur-
ther, the court’s application of case law is suspect because it never
mentions applicable, recent case law in McCleary.  This narrow, strict
application of Bryan without mentioning McCleary, despite both parties
mentioning McCleary frequently throughout their briefs, is part of the
reason why the court is able to go against the current evolution of edu-
cation, specifically charter schools.  The court’s application of case law
allows the court to remain in 1909 rather than applying all relevant case
law to the current hybrid education system of 2015. Had there been
more of a balance between the application of the two cases and a more
articulate reasoning and application of both of them, League of Women
could have come out differently.  At the very least, the application of
League of Women to future education cases would have been more help-
ful because it would have provided a clear, appropriate decision that
applied all applicable case law.
C. The Act Complies with Washington’s “Uniform” and “General”
Common School System
The Washington State Constitution requires that the legislature
“provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.”82  Positive
rights, like this, are common in state constitutions,83 but defining and
applying these positive rights is nearly impossible.  Yet, this is something
that legislatures and courts must do.  Thus, when defining and applying
these ambiguous positive rights, legislatures and courts must interpret
78. Id. at 244.
79. Id. at 258.
80. Id. at 231.
81. Id.
82. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
83. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The general assembly shall . . . provide for the
establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools
throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and
twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously.”); MONT. CONST., art. II, § 4 (providing a
positive right to “individual dignity”); see generally Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and the
Evolution of State Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799 (2002).
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these amorphous rights in the current context.  It is flawed reasoning to
place a static interpretation of positive rights when these rights pur-
posely lend themselves to evolving with society.
State constitutions vary from the Federal Constitution because
many state constitutions contain positive rights mandating public policy
in areas like education.  For example, eighteen state constitutions man-
date that the government assist the poor, and “all fifty state constitu-
tions contain at least the positive right to education.”84  Courts,
however, differ in how to interpret these amorphous positive rights.
Some courts follow the “federal negative-rights model” which effectively
ignores the positive rights guaranteed in the state’s constitution.85
Other states give positive rights “varying degrees of force.”86  Some
courts rely on the separation of powers rationale and give complete def-
erence to state legislatures to determine how to enact positive rights
within their state’s constitution.87  On the other hand, other state
courts, like Montana’s, apply a deferential approach but allow the possi-
bility of a case to enforce positive rights.88  Thus, courts are unsure of
how to interpret positive rights in state constitutions, and this leads to
many discrepancies from state to state.
The Washington Supreme Court, however, recently interpreted
the positive right of education in the constitution’s article IX, section 1
in McCleary.89  When interpreting negative rights, such as the right to
equal protection of the laws,90 the role of the court “is to police the
outer limits of government power, relying on the constitutional enu-
meration of negative rights to set the boundaries.”91  When interpret-
ing positive rights, however, this approach is flawed.  The court in
McCleary notes that when analyzing positive constitutional rights, the
court “is concerned not with whether the State has done too much, but
with whether the State has done enough.”92  In the end, the test pro-
vided by McCleary is to determine “whether the state action achieves or
is reasonably likely to achieve ‘the constitutionally prescribed end.’”93
Thus, when determining whether the Act is constitutional, the court
must determine whether the Act achieves or is reasonably likely to
achieve the constitutionally prescribed general and uniform system of
public schools.
84. Jenna MacNaughton, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law: No Need to Graft, Best





89. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 248 (Wash. 2012) (characterizing article IX,
section 1 as a “ ‘true right,’ created by a ‘positive constitutional grant’”).
90. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. 1, §12 (“No law shall be passed granting to any citi-
zen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.”).
91. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248; see also Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Con-
stitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (1999).
92. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248.
93. Id. (citing Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. at 1137 (1999)).
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Neither party raises the issue of positive rights in their briefs.
Therefore, it is understandable why the court does not address this
issue.  Had the State, however, brought up positive rights under
McCleary, it could have had an interesting argument.  It could have
argued that Washington citizens have a positive right to an education.
Recent standardized test scores and disparities based on race and socio-
economic status, however, show that many Washington students are not
receiving a proper education through the public schools.  Therefore,
the legislature attempted to address this issue through school choice,
and more specifically, establishment of charter schools.  The question
for the court would then become whether the Act “achieves or is rea-
sonably likely to achieve” the constitutionally prescribed end of a “gen-
eral and uniform system of public schools.”  In this case, there are valid
arguments on both sides, and reasonable courts could differ on decid-
ing this issue.  The state would have a strong argument, however, that in
order for public schools to provide an education to all students “with-
out distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex,”94
the legislature must try to alleviate the achievement gap through char-
ter schools.  This argument, however, was not brought to the court so it
was not addressed.
For the appellants and the court in League of Women, however, this
case does not turn on positive rights analysis.  Instead, “this case turns
on the language of article IX, section 2 of [Washington’s] state constitu-
tion and this court’s case law addressing that provision.”95  For the
court, “because charter schools under [the Act] are run by an
appointed board or nonprofit organization and thus are not subject to
local voter control, they cannot qualify as ‘common schools’ within the
meaning of article IX.”96  The court and appellants rely heavily on the
precedent of Bryan from 1909, which, as mentioned previously, con-
fines common schools to those that are “common to all children . . .
free . . . and subject to, and under the control of, the qualified voters of
the school district.”97  The League of Women court follows the Bryan
court’s emphasis on the importance of complete control and argues
that complete control “carries with it the right of the voters, through
their chosen agents, to select qualified teachers, with power to dis-
charge them if they are incompetent.”98
The court’s analysis and reasoning in League of Women is flawed in
its conclusion that charter schools are not common schools.  First, the
court only provides a one-sentence conclusion for its reasoning stating
that because charter schools are not run by voter-elected school boards,
charter schools are not common schools.99  This one sentence fails to
show any reasoning besides complying strictly with the Bryan precedent
94. WASH. CONST. article IX, §1.
95. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131, 1135 (Wash. 2015).
96. Id. at 1137.
97. School Dist. No. 20 v. Bryan, 99 P. 28, 30 (Wash. 1909).
98. Id.
99. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1137 (“Here, because charter schools under I-1240
are run by an appointed board or nonprofit organization and thus are not subject to local
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from 1909.  If the court is going to rely on precedent from 1909 to find
the Act unconstitutional, it must explain its reasoning for relying on
this precedent beyond one conclusory sentence.  The finding of the Act
as unconstitutional will affect the education of students across the state
for decades to come, and the citizens of Washington deserve more than
the limited, conclusory reasoning provided by the court.
Moreover, the court’s limited reasoning allows the appellant’s
argument to slip through without the court specifically denoting how
the appellant met its burden of proof.  The Act was enacted through an
initiative process, and “in approving initiative measures, the people
exercise the same power of sovereignty as the Legislature when it enacts
a statute.”100  Therefore, “a statute enacted through the initiative pro-
cess is, as are other statutes, presumed to be constitutional.”101  Thus,
the challenging party “bears the heavy burden of establishing its uncon-
stitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.”102  In this case, the appellant
carries the heavy burden of proving that enacting the provisions of the
Act cannot be done in a constitutional way under any circumstances.
The court obviously believed that the appellants met this heavy burden,
but the court failed to explain its reasoning.  They failed to explain why
the Act is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Given the dras-
tic implications of this case on the daily lives of Washington citizens, the
court should have explained its reasoning thoroughly, and by not doing
so, the court has left legislators and citizens confused.
Additionally, the court’s reasoning and application of case law fails
to truly examine how much control voters actually have regarding tradi-
tional common schools compared to charter schools under the Act.
Bryan argues that complete control is “a most important feature,” but
the education system was significantly different in 1909.103  Voter con-
trol was easier to obtain because there were fewer students and schools.
Additionally, if voter control was effective today, Washington schools
would likely be performing better than they currently are. Bryan specifi-
cally notes that voter control allows for voters to select qualified teach-
ers and discharge them if they are incompetent.104  However, if this
control were actual rather than theoretical, Washington schools would
not be failing their students.  The Act provides for the ultimate voter
control because voters have chosen to create charter schools to improve
Washington’s failing educational system.  Additionally, while the school
board members of charter schools are not elected by voters, charter
schools provide voters with control over the schooling of their children
through school choice.  Moreover, voters have control regarding the
effectiveness of teachers because if the charter school does not perform
voter control, they cannot qualify as ‘common schools’ within the meaning of article
IX.”).
100. Fed’n of Employees v. State, 901 P.2d 1028, 1034 (Wash. 1995) (citing In re
Estate of Thompson, 692 P.2d 807, 808 (Wash. 1984)).
101. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 11 P.3d 762, 780 (Wash. 2000).
102. Id.
103. School Dist. No. 20 v. Bryan, 99 P. 28, 30 (Wash. 1909).
104. Id.
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well, its contract will not be renewed.  Thus, effective voter control is
not only obtained through elected representation on a school board,
but is also obtained through school choice and accountability
standards.
Additionally, appellants argue that the Act unconstitutionally
exempts charter schools from the vast majority of the Common School
Provisions, including laws regulating scheduling, personnel, funding,
and educational programs.105  The appellants focus on the fact that
charter schools under the Act are not required to offer some of the
requirements under the basic education program described in the
Basic Education Act.106  This argument, however, is flawed.  When stat-
ing the basic education goals of school districts, the legislature specifi-
cally notes that “the state of Washington intends to provide for a public
school system that is able to evolve and adapt in order to better focus
on strengthening the educational achievement of all students.”107
Thus, the legislature intended for these guidelines and goals to evolve
in order to properly serve all students.
Charter schools represent a necessary evolution for the Washing-
ton public school system because the Washington public school system
is failing its students.108  For example, during the 2014–2015 academic
school year, 26.3% of juniors met the minimum standard for English
Language Arts under the Smarter Balanced Assessment and only 13.7%
of juniors met the minimum standard for math under the Smarter Bal-
anced Assessment.109  These results are unacceptable and pose major
concerns for the success of our society in the future.  Therefore, it is
understandable why the voters of Washington passed the Act by initia-
tive in order to attempt to provide better opportunities for students
through charter schools.  Clearly, the current goals and procedures of
the public school system are ineffective, and therefore, it is essential for
the state to evolve and test new strategies in order to provide students
with their constitutionally protected right to education.  Charter
schools are one example of this necessary evolution because they
innately have a hybrid character that mixes the public availability of
school for all students with private, consumer-driven results.  The court
in League of Women failed to even address the issue of educational differ-
ences between traditional public schools and charter schools under the
Act.  Again, the court failed to effectuate its duty by ignoring a central
issue to the argument.
105. Brief of Respondent at 31, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355
P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0).
106. Id.; see RCW 28A.150.220.
107. RCW 28A.150.210.
108. See Washington State Report Card, OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUC-
TION, http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/summary.aspx?groupLevel=District&schoolId=1&
reportLevel=State&year=2014-15 (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (providing the percentage of
students who met the standards set for English Language Arts, Math, Science, and EOC
Biology).
109. Id.
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D. Increased Accountability to Tax Payers
The main job of schools is to provide a quality education to stu-
dents.  This education in common schools must be “general” and “uni-
form” under the Washington State Constitution.110  Under Bryan, the
voters of Washington are holding the common schools accountable for
this job.  However, Washington’s public common schools are struggling
academically.  For example, 26.3% of juniors in high school for the
2014–2015 school year met the standards set for English Language Arts
and 13.7% of juniors met the standards set in Math for the 2014–2015
school year.111  These scores indicate that merely having elected school
board officials is not enough to allow voters to hold common schools
accountable.
Charter schools, however, are subject to rigorous accountability
requirements.  Charter schools must meet the same academic require-
ments as traditional public schools because charter schools must meet
the Essential Academic Learning Requirements (EALRs).112  EALRs
state what every child should know at each grade level, and they are
comprehensive.  For example, the science EALRs are described in more
than 92 pages and provide generous detail.113  Public charter schools
must provide instruction in the various EALRs subjects at each grade
level.114  However, what differentiates public charter schools from tradi-
tional public schools regarding application of EALRs is that unlike
traditional public schools, charter schools can be closed for failing to
meet performance expectations.115  Additionally, charter school autho-
rizers may require a “corrective action plan” at any time while the char-
ter is operating, and charter schools must score above the “bottom
quartile of public schools to be eligible to renew their contract, absent
extraordinary circumstances.”116  Yet, under Bryan, the more accounta-
ble form of schooling is the current traditional public school system, in
110. WASH. CONST. art. IX, §2.
111. Washington State Report Card, OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUC-
TION, http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/summary.aspx?groupLevel=District&schoolId=1&
reportLevel=State&year=2014-15 (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
112. See RCW 28A.710.040(2)(b) (stating that all charter schools must provide basic
education, as provided in RCW 28A.150.210, including instruction in the essential aca-
demic learning requirements and participate in the statewide student assessment system
as developed under RCW 28A.655.070); RCW 28A.150.210 (setting the goals of each dis-
trict to provide opportunities for every student to: (1) read with comprehension, write
effectively, and communicate successfully in a variety of ways and settings and with a vari-
ety of audiences; (2) know and apply core concepts and principles of math, social, physi-
cal and life sciences, civics and history, arts, and health and fitness; (3) think analytically,
logically, and creatively; and (4) understand the importance of work and finance and how
performance, effort and decisions directly affect future career and educational
opportunities).
113. Brief of Respondent at 9, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d
1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0).
114. RCW 28A.710.040(2)(b).
115. RCW 28A.710.200.
116. Brief of Respondent at 12, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355
P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0); see RCW 28A.710.180(4).
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which schools are required to implement a “corrective action plan” only
when they fall into the bottom five percent of public schools.117
Additionally, before charter schools may be authorized, they must
go through a rigorous application process to show their credibility.
Along with the Commission’s extensive regulations and approval crite-
ria, each applicant must submit a host of other plans, such as a planned
curriculum and evidence the curriculum is based on proven methods, a
description of teaching methods and instructional strategies, and a plan
for serving various types of students.118 The Act’s extensive and thor-
ough application process as well as monitoring measures help ensure
that charter schools are providing the quality education that is the right
of every Washington student.  The court, however, never acknowledges
these forms of accountability.  Instead, the court focuses all of its time
on the minor fact that the charter school board members are
appointed rather than elected.
Additionally, the court was concerned about the voters’ ability to
hold charter schools accountable without a voice on the charter school
board.  However, the charter school board is an agency of the state in
many ways.  The Washington state legislature has specifically noted that
“[t]he people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies
which serve them . . . . The people insist on remaining informed so that
they may retain control over the instruments they have created.”119
Thus, charter schools are a creature of the state as they are allowed by
the state.  Therefore, the state, through voter-elected officials, will help
hold charter schools accountable.  The court fails to acknowledge this
argument.
Moreover, the court’s application of Bryan is static, and the court
ignores the fact that voter control can be obtained through more ways
than elected school boards.  Charter schools are created through a
charter, and under the Act, in evaluating applicants, the Commission
and school district authorizers must hold a public forum.120  Once
approved, charter schools enter into a contract with the authorizer.121
The contract ensures that academic performance will be monitored
and puts compliance measures in place “for student achievement, com-
parative performance, student progress, post-secondary readiness, state
and federal accountability, mission-specific accountability, financial
compliance, and organizational performance.”122  This contract argua-
bly provides more accountability to taxpayers than the election of a
school board member.
117. RCW 28A.657.020.
118. Brief of Respondent at 10–11, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355
P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0) (listing nineteen requirements charter school





122. Brief of Respondent at 11, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355
P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0).
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Additionally, the court fails to note, when evaluating whether char-
ter schools provide enough voter control to be public enough to be
common schools, that the Act values and emphasizes transparency.
While charter schools are run by appointed charter school boards,
these boards are not making decisions and taking action in the
shadows, behind closed doors.  Instead, “charter school authorizers and
public charter schools are subject to the Public Records Act and the
Open Public Meetings Act.”123  Moreover, an annual report comparing
the performance of public charter schools and similarly situated tradi-
tional public schools must be produced by the State Board of Education
for the governor, legislature, and public at large.124  Thus, the Act pro-
vides ample transparency and continuous evaluation and evolution.
This transparency and evaluation is essential for the success of any form
of schooling, and it provides voters with the opportunity to remain
informed on how their tax dollars are being spent and the fruits of that
expense.  The court failed to take into consideration transparency and
annual public evaluation as a form of accountability and voter control.
Thus, the court ended with an opinion suited for the common schools
in operation in 1909 rather than the current hybrid education system in
2015.
E. Constitutionality of Funding Provisions within the Act
The lower King County Superior Court held that “charter schools
are not ‘common schools’ under article IX of Washington’s Constitu-
tion and, therefore, the common school construction fund could not
be appropriated to charter schools.”125  The lower court held, however,
that “the provisions permitting such appropriations were severable” and
held the Act otherwise constitutional.126  The Washington Supreme
Court, nevertheless, found that the Act’s funding provisions, which
attempt to access funds allocated to common schools, violate article IX
of the constitution.127  Further, the court found that “because the pro-
visions designating and funding charter schools as common schools are
integral to the Act, such void provisions are not severable, and that
determination is dispositive of the present case.”128
As previously mentioned, the court neglected its duty by relying on
select precedent from 1909 without taking the time to explain its rea-
soning when finding that charter schools are not common schools.
123. Id. at 12; see RCW 28A.710.040(2)(h).
124. Brief of Respondent at 12, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355
P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0); see RCW 28A.710 (defining similarly situated
schools as schools that have “academically, ethnically, and economically comparable
groups of students.”  Additionally, the report must include an assessment of the “success,
challenges, and areas for improvement in meeting the purposes of this chapter, including
the board’s assessment of the sufficiency of funding for charter schools, the efficacy of the
formula for authorizer funding, and any suggested changes in state law or policy neces-
sary to strengthen the state’s charter schools.”).
125. League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131, 1135 (Wash. 2015).
126. Id. at 1135.
127. Id. at 1133.
128. Id. at 1133–34.
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Had the court reviewed the issue under the appropriate light of
McCleary and put Bryan’s dicta regarding voter control in perspective,
the court would likely have found that charter schools are common
schools.  Had that happened, the funding provisions would not have
been at issue.  This, however, did not happen.  Yet, even under this
holding, the funding provisions that provide charter schools with fund-
ing from accounts restricted to common schools can easily be severed
from the Act.  This argument was supported in League of Women by Jus-
tice Fairhurst and the lower court.
A legislative act cannot be found to be “unconstitutional in its
entirety unless invalid provisions are unseverable” and “it cannot rea-
sonably be believed that the legislative body would have passed one
without the other, or unless elimination of the invalid part would
render the remaining part useless to accomplish the legislative pur-
poses.”129  Here, the Act contained a severability clause which provides
assurance that the voters, through the initiative, would have enacted the
Act without invalid provisions.  The court held that the “invalid provi-
sions are so intertwined with the remainder of the Act and so funda-
mental to the Act’s efficacy that . . . the invalid portions are not
severable.”130
The Washington Constitution only requires that three restricted
funds go to common schools: the permanent common school fund; the
state tax for common schools; and the common school construction
fund.131  The court is mistaken in its reasoning that the invalid provi-
sions are too intertwined with the Act to be severable.  The Act does not
take resources from any of the three constitutionally restricted funds,
and the charter schools can easily be funded through the general fund
and state building construction account.
First, the Act does not have to take resources from the restricted
funds.  For example, the permanent common school fund is made of
the principal of the fund and the interest that accrues.  The principal of
the fund must remain intact.132  Appellants do not argue that the Act
improperly appropriates the principal of the fund so the principal is a
non-issue.  Additionally, the Act does not divert any of the interest from
the common school fund.  When the legislature froze the principal of
the fund, it directed the accruing interest from the fund to go to the
common school construction fund.133  Therefore, the interest from the
common school fund cannot be utilized by any public school, tradi-
tional or charter, for any type of operation costs.  Thus, it is clear that
129. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 11 P.3d 762, 791 (Wash. 2000).
130. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1141.
131. See WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2–3 (Section 2 requires that “the entire revenue
derived from the common school fund and the state tax for common schools shall be
exclusively applied to the support of the common schools.”  Section 3 establishes “the
common school construction fund to be used exclusively for the purpose of financing the
construction of facilities for the common schools.”).
132. League of Women, , 355 P.3d at 1142; see also RCW 28A.515.300(1) (“The princi-
pal of the common school fund as the same existed on June 30, 1965, shall remain perma-
nent and irreducible.”).
133. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1142.
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the Act does not utilize any funds from the permanent common school
fund.
Additionally, the state tax for common schools is restricted to the
support of common schools.134  This revenue from state taxes for com-
mon schools is held in the general fund, “from which [Washington’s]
public education system receives support.”135  This state tax for com-
mon schools only constitutes a fraction of the total appropriations for
public schools in Washington.136  In fact, “only 28 percent of the reve-
nue appropriated for public education from the general fund is
restricted,”137 and the legislature uses much more money than merely
what is collected from the state tax to properly fund the public school
system.138  Additionally, the Act only allows for the creation of a maxi-
mum of forty charter schools over a five-year period, and now more
than eight schools may be established in any year within the five-year
period.139  Charter schools under the Act make up only two percent of
Washington’s public schools,140 and therefore, charter schools can eas-
ily be funded through the remaining seventy-two percent of the general
fund that is not restricted to common schools.
Therefore, the majority’s argument that the funding provisions of
the Act are unseverable is simply not true.  By deeming the provisions
unseverable, the court is essentially contending that the mere holding
of tax dollars for common schools contaminates the entire general
school fund from being used for anything besides common schools.  If
this were true, then the legislature’s approach to school funding has
been unconstitutional for decades because the general school fund
allocates resources beyond K-12 public schools to human services,
higher education, general government, natural resources, and other
things such as debt service, pensions, other education, transportation,
and special appropriations.141
Additionally, the Act does not require access to the common
school construction fund.  The Act states that “[c]harter schools are
eligible for state funding for school construction.”142  The court found
this requirement by the Act unseverable, but once again, the court’s
superficial interpretation created a flawed analysis.  The legislature
134. RCW 84.52.065 (“[I]n each year the state shall levy for collection in the follow-
ing year for the support of common schools of the state a tax.”).
135. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1143; see RCW 84.52.067 (“All property taxes lev-
ied by the state for the support of common schools shall be paid into the general fund of
the state treasury as provided in RCW 84.56.280.”).
136. See League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1143.
137. Id.
138. Brief of Respondent at 30, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355
P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0) (“The revenue from ‘the state tax for common
schools’ made up only about 29 percent of the legislature’s appropriation to the Superin-
tendent for allocation to Washington’s public schools in 2012.”).
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.710.150 (2016).
140. League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1143.
141. SENATE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO WASHINGTON STATE
K–12 FINANCE, S. 63, Reg. Sess., at 15 (2014), http://leg.wa.gov/Senate/Committees/
WM/Documents/2014%20K12%20Citizens%20Guide.pdf.
142. WASH. REV. Code § 28A.710.230(1) (2016).
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does not rely solely on the common school construction fund to fund
school construction.  In fact, the legislature uses resources from both
the common school construction fund and the state building construc-
tion account to fund school construction.143  Thus, the legislature may
constitutionally fund the construction for charter schools under the Act
through the state building construction account or even the general
fund.
Therefore, the Act does not require funding from constitutionally
restricted funds.  The Act provides that “[c]ategorical funding must be
allocated to a charter school based on the same funding criteria used
for non-charter public schools. . . .”144  This provision does not
expressly require funding from constitutionally restricted funds.
Instead, it merely asks that the legislature do what it always has done
when determining basic education appropriations.  Each year, the legis-
lature must adjust basic education appropriations between basic educa-
tion programs.  It must move appropriations around in order to best
adapt to changes in school district demographics, changes in popula-
tion, and changes in academic programs.  The Act only requires that,
once again, the legislature must adapt where it allocates resources and
allow the money to follow the student.  Thus, by finding the funding
provisions unseverable, the court is essentially finding that other pro-
grams, such as Running Start,145 where allocations are made based on
student enrollment in programs, do not meet constitutional muster.
This line of reasoning is simply illogical, and thus, the court erred in
finding the funding provisions of the Act severable.
F. Essential Evolution of the Washington School System
The system of education has evolved greatly over time, and Wash-
ington’s public school system is no exception.  Washington’s public
school system has evolved in order to meet the needs of a changing
society in the 125 years since the Washington Constitution was adopted.
For example, Washington’s public schools have advanced from one-
room school houses serving students for about three months per year,
“to graded schools gradually serving students for longer periods, to a
system that serves students nine months of the year or more and
includes high schools and kindergarten.”146  Additionally, just as the
formatting of schooling has evolved over the years, so have the
demographics of Washington.  In 1889, at statehood, Washington had
three high schools with a total of 320 students enrolled.147  In contrast,
143. See League of Women, 355 P.3d at 1143.
144. WASH. REV. Code § 28A.710.220(2) (2012), amended in 2016.
145. Running Start is a program run by the state of Washington that provides for
students in high school to attend certain institutions to simultaneously earn a high school
degree and college/university credit. See generally Secondary Education: Running Start,
OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, http://www.k12.wa.us/Secondary-
Education/CareerCollegeReadiness/RunningStart.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
146. Brief of Respondent at 4, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d
1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0).
147. See id. at 5.
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the Washington public school system now serves “more than one mil-
lion students, in about 2,281 public schools statewide.”148  Thus, it is
illogical to view Washington’s school system as stagnate.  Moreover, it is
misguided to believe that the legislature or past precedent ever
intended the Washington school system, as set up by the constitution,
to be static because a system of education must evolve with the society it
sets to prepare students to participate in the future.
The legislature purposely embodied and made clear their inten-
tion for the Washington school district to evolve.  When listing the goals
of school districts, the legislature purposely notes that:
A basic education is an evolving program of instruction that is intended
to provide students with the opportunity to become responsible
and respectful global citizens, to contribute to their economic
well-being and that of their families and communities, to explore
and understand different perspectives, and to enjoy productive
and satisfying lives.  Additionally, the state of Washington intends to
provide for a public school system that is able to evolve and adapt in
order to better focus on strengthening the educational achievement of
all students, which includes high expectations for all students and
gives all students the opportunity to achieve personal and aca-
demic success.149
School choice, and charter schools in particular, represent the current
evolution of the education system.  The legislature made room for this
type of evolution, and thus, the legislature should have been given
more deference by the League of Women court.
Moreover, charter schools are not the first attempt at evolving the
Washington public school system with innovative programs.150  The
state currently runs a program called Running Start, which allows
juniors and seniors in high school to enroll in college courses for both
high school and college credit.151  Similar to what the charter schools
are asking for, the higher education institutions involved in Running
Start receive “state basic education funding, calculated based on the
148. Id.
149. WASH. REV. Code § 28A.150.210 (2011) (emphasis added) (listing the goals for
each school district when providing for a basic education).
150. Brief of Respondent at 6, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d
1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0) (“Funding appropriated for basic education similarly
supports a wide variety of other programs operated by non-district entities, including: (1)
University of Washington programs for selected academically gifted students, (2) Wash-
ington Youth Academy, a residential school for at-risk youth run by the National Guard,
(3) work-based learning, (4) online courses and other alternative learning experiences,
(5) contracted special education and other services provided by educational service dis-
tricts or non-sectarian private entities, (6) schools for juvenile offenders housed in adult
corrections facilities that can be operated by educational service districts, higher educa-
tion institutions, or private entities, and (7) tribal schools operated by tribes under
compacts.”).
151. See MIKE HUBERT ET AL., LEARNING BY CHOICE: STUDENT ENROLLMENT OPTIONS
IN WASHINGTON STATE, WASHINGTON SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION (2014),
http://www.k12.wa.us/GeneralInfo/pubdocs/LearningByChoice2014.pdf.
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number of public school students participating.”152  The school dis-
tricts do not control the colleges involved in the program, nor do they
control the colleges’ professors.  Thus, the Washington school system
has evolved over time in order to better prepare its students for college
through the Running Start program.  Colleges and technical schools
within this program receive funding per student involved without the
voter control deemed essential through Bryan.
In addition to Running Start, Washington school districts also
operate “innovative schools, which can select top performing stu-
dents.”153  Additionally, these innovative schools have private boards of
directors, and their curriculum differs from traditional public
schools.154  For example, Raisbeck Aviation High School is “an innova-
tive math-and science-focused college-preparatory high school,” which
serves students from twenty-seven school districts in the Puget Sound
region.155  Innovative schools, like Raisbeck Aviation, have a common
set of characteristics including but not limited to: a “bold, creative[,]
and innovative educational ideas; high standards for students and staff;
high level of parent and community involvement; high level of educa-
tional experimentation; . . . [and] use of multiple approaches to
address different learning styles.”156  Under the Act, charter schools are
similar to innovative schools.  The main difference is that charter
schools help cater to low-income, at-risk students.  Thus, charter schools
under the Act are simply another version of innovative schools seeking
to join a long list of constitutional programs, all part of Washington’s
public education system.
Running Start and the many other forms of basic education pro-
grams funded by the state, without being operated by district entities,
highlight the necessary evolution and direction needed for Washington
Public Schools, and they highlight the outdated structure within Bryan.
Thus, the court erred in relying so heavily on the Bryan precedent from
1909 that it failed to understand the ever-evolving nature of education.
Moreover, the court was so blinded by Bryan that it failed to realize that
evolution within the education system is necessary in order to uphold
the students’ positive right to education.
Had the court applied the more recent case of McCleary, the hold-
ing would likely have been different.  As McCleary states, “the program
of basic education is not etched in constitutional stone.”157  Addition-
ally, McCleary provides recent precedent of the court providing the
greatest possible latitude to the legislature to implement a constitu-
152. Brief of Respondent at 6, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d
1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0).
153. Id. at 7; see WASH. REV. Code § 28A.300.550 (outlining the criteria, identifica-
tion, and publicity requirements for Washington innovation, or charter, schools).
154. See Brief of Respondent at 7, League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355
P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015) (No. 89714-0).
155. Raisbeck Aviation High School, School Information, HIGHLINE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(2016), http://www.highlineschools.org/Page/9887 (visited last Mar. 5, 2016).
156. Innovative Schools, OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, http://
www.k12.wa.us/EducationAwards/Innovative/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
157. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 231 (Wash. 2012).
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tional mandate such as the education clause.158  Further, the McCleary
court, which decided the case a mere three years prior to League of
Women, recognized that the education system must adapt and evolve as
society changes. McCleary specifically states that “the legislature has an
obligation to review the basic education program as the needs of students
and the demands of society evolve. From time to time, the legislature will
need to evaluate whether new offerings must be included in the basic educa-
tion program.”159
Thus, just a mere three years before League of Women, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held the legislature accountable to amply fund state
public schools.  It emphasized the need for the legislature to change its
procedures as “the needs of students and the demands of society
evolve” and to determine whether “new offerings must be included in
the basic education program.”160  Yet, three years later, this same court
decides to rely on precedent from 1909 rather than defer to the legisla-
ture.  Further, the court denied the legislature the ability to do what the
court had previously encouraged —create new offerings for students.
The court never mentions McCleary, and thus, the court fails to analyze
the legal issue at hand in the proper context.  By ignoring recent
McCleary precedent in favor of Bryan, which was decided over a decade
ago, the court fails to see that charter schools represent an encouraged,
necessary, and constitutional evolution within the education program
that falls in line with many other state funded programs within the pub-
lic school system.  Therefore, the court comes to the incorrect legal
conclusion that charter schools are unconstitutional.
G. League of Women and Future State Constitutional Challenges
Many states have addressed various state constitutional challenges
to charter school statutes.  A common constitutional challenge to char-
ter schools, and school choice in general, is a uniformity challenge.161
Most state constitutions contain a uniformity provision of some sort
requiring a uniform public education.162  While the provisions range
from open-ended requirements to quite specific guarantees, most uni-
formity provisions accompany the establishment of state public educa-
tion systems with various adjectives to describe such systems, and in
many cases, one of those adjectives is “uniform.”163
158. See id. at 248.
159. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
160. Id.
161. See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
162. See INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, SCHOOL CHOICE AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A GUIDE
TO DESIGNING SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS 5–6, https://ij.org/images/pdf_folder/
school_choice/50statereport/introduction.pdf.
163. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state
to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders.
Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality
system of free public schools. . . .”) (emphasis added); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“[To]
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free
public schools. . . .”) (emphasis added).
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One kind of uniformity challenge to the constitutionality of char-
ter schools involves claims alleging that charter schools undermine the
uniformity of the public school system because charter schools are
freed from many of the curricular and administrative restrictions linked
with traditional public schools.  For example, in State ex rel. Ohio Congress
of Parents and Teachers v. State Board of Education, plaintiffs argued that
charter schools—or “community schools” as they are referred to in
Ohio—prevent the state from providing the constitutionally mandated
“thorough and efficient” system of public schools by diverting funding
away from traditional public schools to “community schools.”164  The
Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument and reasoned that charter
schools were a constitutionally valid form of educational reform and
that the Ohio constitution does not prohibit the reduction in state
funding of traditional public schools when students leave the tradi-
tional public school system for other options.165  The dissenting jus-
tices, however, proposed an argument that aligned with the majority’s
argument in League of Women.  The justices reasoned that charter
schools undermine the public education system and could not be com-
mon schools entitled to public funds because they were essentially pri-
vately operated and not under the control of a local school board.166
State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers was decided in 2006, but
League of Women shows a potential shift in state court analysis.  It is likely
that League of Women will spur rejuvenated uniformity challenges across
the country in the hope that more courts will fall in line with the dissent
of State ex rel Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers and League of Women.
Other plaintiffs frame a uniformity challenge in a slightly different
light by alleging that charter school laws violate state uniformity clauses
by removing control centralized in local school boards and placing that
control in private, individualized charter school boards.  For example,
in Gwinnett County School District v. Cox, the Georgia Supreme Court
invalidated the charter school statute after finding the statute to be
inconsistent with the state’s constitutional provision vesting control of
public schools in local school boards.167  After this case, however, the
Georgia Constitution was amended to allow for the authorization of
charter schools by groups other than local school boards.168  Given the
resolve of the Washington Supreme Court,169 a constitutional amend-
ment would likely be required to allow for charter schools in the State
of Washington.
Other courts, however, have rejected uniformity challenges to
charter schools.  These courts have relied on the reasoning that the
164. See State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857
N.E.2d 1148 (Ohio 2006).
165. Id. at 1160–64.
166. Id. at 1167–70.
167. Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 710 S.E.2d 773 (Ga. 2011).
168. See Motoko Rich, Charter Schools Win Support in Georgia Vote, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8,
2012, at P15.
169. See League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015),
motion for reconsideration denied, League of Women Voters, 355 P.3d at 1131.
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state legislatures have the power to restructure the public education
system to meet the needs of the state.170  The courts’ reasoning of hon-
oring the wide latitude given to legislatures to create and modify a
state’s education system as needed resembles the reasoning in McCleary.
In McCleary, the court held that “the program of basic education is not
etched in constitutional stone,” and “[t]he legislature has an obligation
to review the basic education program as the needs of students and the
demands of society evolve.”171  The court, however, failed to apply this
same deference to the legislature in League of Women.  Thus, League of
Women represents a potential narrowing of the wide latitude provided to
legislatures when running a state’s educational system.  This potential
shift in jurisprudence is concerning and poses a serious separation of
powers issue because the court begins to infringe on the duties of the
state legislature.  The Washington Supreme Court in McCleary
instructed the legislature to evolve and find a way to provide an amply
funded, quality education for the citizens of Washington, but in League
of Women, the court ignores McCleary and essentially tells the legislature:
You can evolve, but not that much.  The court imposes itself in an area
where the legislature should have deference.  Thus, League of Women
poses an opportunity for further challenges to legislature deference
regarding the structuring and execution of a state’s education system.
League of Women could be pointed to as a precedent on which to
challenge charter schools in general across the country.  For example,
the case could be used as precedent to challenge charter schools in
Minnesota, the first state to enact charter schools.172  However, apply-
ing League of Women to a challenge to Minnesota charter schools would
prove difficult because Minnesota’s constitution does not have a “com-
mon school” provision or an exclusive funding requirement.173  This
exemplifies the difficulty in applying precedent from one state to edu-
cational law in another state.  Each state constitution has similarities
such as educational provisions in general.  Many states also provide for
positive rights to an education that is “equal” or “uniform” or “general.”
These similarities, however, do not alleviate the fact that most states
have slightly different language and provisions within the education
sections of their constitutions.  Therefore, it is unlikely to have a one to
one comparison between state constitutions and case law.  While League
of Women represents a potential shift in thinking about the constitution-
ality of charter schools, which will likely spur constitutional challenges
in many other states, the court’s reasoning and analysis of Washington’s
170. See State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents and Teachers, 857 N.E.2d. at 1148; Wilson v.
State Bd. Of Ed., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
171. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 231 (Wash. 2012).
172. See Marshall H. Tanick, Are charter schools unconstitutional?, STAR TRIB. (Sept. 30,
2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.startribune.com/k-12-educationare-charter-schools-unconsti-
tutional/330178111/.
173. See Steve Kelley, Counterpoint: No, charters are NOT unconstitutional, STAR TRIB.
(Oct. 6, 2015, 6:17 PM), http://www.startribune.com/counterpoint-no-charters-are-not-
unconstitutional/330979001/.
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unique funding provisions and “common school” provision make the
case difficult to accurately apply to challenges in other states.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is not the Washington Supreme Court’s job to determine policy.
However, the court must utilize the proper standard of review, case law,
and reasoning when determining cases.  In League of Women, the court
failed to do so.  The court failed to hold the appellants to the proper
standard of review which begins by viewing initiatives as constitutional
and places a high burden on the appellants to prove otherwise beyond
a reasonable doubt.  The court’s one-line of reasoning stating that char-
ter schools are unconstitutional based on century-old precedent is not
enough.  Further, the court failed to review all relevant case law.  The
court never references McCleary, which was decided a mere three years
before League of Women.  The fact that the court never references
McCleary when it is highlighted frequently in both parties’ briefs and is
relevant case law, shows that the court had its 1909 blinders on when
analyzing this case.  Therefore, the court neglected to recognize the
true accountability demanded of charter schools which helps provide
much needed control to the voters and parents.  Moreover, even if the
court determined that charter schools are not common schools, the Act
still should have been constitutional.  The majority failed to take a logi-
cal approach to the funding provisions when determining their sever-
ability.  The Act should have been constitutional because charter
schools can be funded without access to the three constitutionally
restricted funds.
The court should not get in the way of the legislature providing for
the public education of citizens.  The court should have given the legis-
lature deference to help the public school system evolve in order to
better suit the needs of the students and society.  Forty-three states and
the District of Columbia have found charter schools public enough to
be constitutionally part of the public school system.  Many other states
have embraced the direction of education reform.  They have accepted
that in order for schools to properly serve the current society, there
cannot be strict lines between private and public.  The public’s concep-
tion of public schooling has shifted from a strictly public service to
more of a public good which may be improved through private-sector
concepts.  In League of Women, however, the court fails to acknowledge
these changing ideals and apply them to the state constitution.  There-
fore, League of Women’s analysis is flawed.  The consequences of this has
major negative implications for the future education of Washington stu-
dents who are left with a legislature unable to innovate and experiment
with the modern hybrid nature of today’s public education in order to
provide an education for its students that meets the needs of current
society.
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